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This article examines the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court regarding the constitutional due process require-
ments for validation of the prejudgment remedies of replevin,
attachment, and garnishment. These decisions are analyzed with
regard to Florida law as it presently exists as well as ways the
law could be amended to comport with both the dictates of the
Supreme Court and the traditional protections afforded the
debtor by Florida law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Creditors' prejudgment remedies have historically functioned
as a means of removing certain property of the debtor from his
possession or control prior to any input by the debtor in a judicial
hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim. Such remedies, or the
writs upon which they are based, are also known as provisional ones
because the temporary taking becomes final only after the creditor
has prevailed at a hearing in which the debtor may present his
defenses. Thus, if the debtor prevails, his property is restored to
him. Therefore, it is suggested that creditors' remedies which re-
quire prior notice to the debtor and an opportunity for him to pres-
ent defenses at a hearing which preceeds any temporary deprivation
of his property - even if the hearing is expeditiously provided and
litigable issues are limited - are something other or less than a
prejudgment remedy. Within this definitional framework, the bot-
tom line for Florida practitioners is that secured creditors once more
have a general right to prejudgment replevin, and, while general
creditors currently lack prejudgment remedies in attachment and
probably garnishment, this deficiency is legislatively remedial.
* This article updates an earlier work of the writer appearing at 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 60
(1972).
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
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To the casual observer, the ebb and flow of the constitutional
validity of Florida's prejudgment remedies tested against standards
of procedural due process, is no doubt perplexing. In the recent case
of Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co.,' the Supreme Court
of Florida found this state's attachment statute2 to be constitution-
ally infirm. Based on the reasoning of that case, it is suggested that
Florida's prejudgment garnishment procedure' is likewise lacking in
due process requirements. Prior to Unique Caterers, the invalida-
tion of the state's prejudgment replevin procedure by the Supreme
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin4 resulted in the enactment of a successor
statute which provided only charily for prejudgment takings.' More
recent legislation' has fully restored, however, the secured creditor's
provisional replevin remedy. These judicial and legislative actions
are understandable only in the context of the evolution of the cur-
rent requisites of due process in the area of debtor-creditor relations.
Prior to 1969, there was great divergence in the availability of
prejudgment remedies from state to state. This was a reflection of
different attitudes toward the debtor-creditor relationship and was
made possible by the almost unfettered discretion given state legis-
latures and courts to set forth the ambit of such remedies. This
historic freedom from any federal standard of control is perhaps best
illustrated by the Supreme Court's refusal to find a deprivation of
due prcess in Ownbey v. Morgan,7 a Delaware proceeding that not
only preconditioned prejudgment release of property to the debtor
upon posting of surety bond but also required a nonresident individ-
ual to enter the same security as a condition to making appearance
and defending the action.
Florida has historically treated debtors more benignly. In an
earlier work' the author has treated in some detail the benefits and
limitations of prejudgment remedies in this jurisdiction. It should
suffice to note that the statutory and case law of Florida have re-
stricted and tempered the use of prejudgment garnishment and at-
1. 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 76 (1975).
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 77 (1975).
4. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
5. Law of May 8, 1973, ch. 73-20, § 1 (repealed 1976). The repealed section is FLA. STAT.
§ 78.073 (1975).
6. Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19, § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (Supp. 1976).
7. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
8. Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 60 (1972).
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tachment by: (1) requiring that express statutory grounds for the
writ be present; (2) placing limitations on the type of underlying
claims that may give rise to the use of the provisional writs; (3)
requiring that the creditor file bond with surety conditioned to pay
all costs and damages which the debtor sustains in consequence of
the creditor's improperly suing out the writ; and (4) creating provi-
sions for liberal exemptions that insulate certain property against
prejudgment as well as postjudgment levies.'
As it is traditionally applied in Florida, the requirement of
express statutory grounds for a writ has limited the creditor's right
to seek attachment to cases of nonresidency, absence or conceal-
ment which defeats personal service, or cases in which there is
threatened or actual removal or disposition of the property.' Simi-
larly, to invoke the aid of prejudgment garnishment the creditor's
motion initiating the writ must state "that movant does not believe
that defendant will have in his possession after execution is issued,
visible property in this state and in the county in which the action
is pending on which a levy can be made sufficient to satisfy plain-
tiffs claim."" Within these limitations, however, the creditor invok-
ing the provisional aid of attachment and garnishment has received
a measure of immediate protection against diminution in value of
the property that might provide the only means of partially or fully
satisfying his claims; a basis, where needed, for quasi in rem juris-
diction; and an all important early lien acquisition in subsequent
contests with third parties. 2
Since replevin lies for any person whose personal property is
wrongfully detained, it has long been useful to secured parties in
this state who have the right upon the debtor's default to take
possession of their collateral. 3 As the creditor's use of replevin is
limited to those instances in which he has a present and possessory
property interest, in contrast to the lien acquired only by judicial
attachment procedures, no further special grounds for the replevin
writ have been imposed. When prejudgment replevin has been made
generally available to secured creditors, Florida has imposed a mea-
9. Id. at 63-76.
10. Id. at 63-68.
11. FLA. STAT. § 77.031 (1975).
12. Williams, supra note 8, at 60-63.
13. Id. at 90-100.
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sure of protection for the debtor by requiring the creditor to post
bond. 4
Finally, it should be noted that Florida statutes presently pro-
vide and have formerly provided that a debtor, subjected to any of
the provisional writs, may immediately recover his property by
posting bond. 5 While not constituting a limitation on the use of the
prejudgment remedies, the provision is an important one in assess-
ing the hardship imposed on the debtor by the prejudgment taking.
Not all jurisdictions have provided the safeguards to the debtor
incorporated by Florida procedure, however. Moreover, do such
safeguards validate the temporary taking inherent in the prejudg-
ment remedies in all the instances in which the laws of the various
states have made these remedies available? In its 1969 decision,
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.," the Supreme Court held that
they did not and thus set the stage for a new era in balancing the
rights of debtor and creditor in prejudgment remedies.
II. Sniadach AND Fuentes: ESTABLISHMENT AND EXTENTION OF PRIOR
NOTICE AND HEARING
Sniadach presented a particularly appealing case in which to
recognize the debtor's due process rights. The resident debtor's
wages were garnished prior to notice and an opportunity to be heard
and "no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor
interest"'" was present. Although the .Court held that "summary
procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraor-
dinary situations,"'" the case at bar was easily distinguished and
removed from the sanctioned parameters. Although the Court in
Sniadach attempted no compendium of causes that would require
special protection to a state or creditor interest, creditors in jurisdic-
tions like Florida, that generally limit attachment and garnishment
writs to cases of special need, could take solace in the Sniadach
14. Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19, § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (3)(Supp. 1976)
(current prejudgment replevin law); Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28 (repealed 1973)
(former prejudgment replevin law).
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.18, 76.19 (attachment), 77.24 (garnishment) (1975); Law of May 19,
(current prejudgment replevin law) 1976, ch. 76-19 § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (4)
(Supp. 1976); Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28 (repealed 1973) (former prejudgment
replevin law).
16. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).





Furthermore, the Court's opinion in Sniadach was susceptible
to an interpretation that limited its requirements to prejudgment
takings of only particular types of property. Thus, in the interim
between Sniadach and the Supreme Court's next decision applying
due process standards to creditors' provisional remedies, Fuentes
v. Shevin,9 three competing theories as to the effect of Sniadach
were developed by the lower courts. Some courts held that consti-
tutional attacks on attachment and garnishment failed when the
subject of the writs was not wages. 20 A competing theory which,
although still limiting Sniadach to a particular type of property,
nevertheless greatly expanded the scope of coverage, was articu-
lated by the Supreme Court of California. 21 This decision relied
heavily on an analogy between "ages" and "necessities of life" and
extended the parameters of Sniadach to all significant property
interests. Finally, other courts refused to recognize any restriction
arising from the type of property subjected to attachment and
garnishment. 2 2 This latter theory was to prevail.
Paralleling the development of these competing doctrines as to
the type of property immunized from prejudgment attachment and
garnishment was the development of further conflict among lower
courts on a related question: What was the applicability of
Sniadach to the provisional remedies of the secured creditor to re-
cover his collateral by replevin or like procedure under claim and
delivery statutes?2 1 This issue, as was the issue of whether
Sniadach's due process rights were restricted to certain types of
property, was resolved in favor of the applicability of the due pro-
cess tests in Fuentes.
Fuentes did indeed mark the pinnacle of due process restraints
on prejudgment writs. Not only did the holding obviate any distinc-
tions founded on gradations in the importance of the property to the
debtor 4 and fail to accord the secured creditor's provisional reme-
19. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
20. See, e.g. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150.
21. Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
22. See Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87
(1970); Larson v. Featherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
23. Compare Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
with Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
24. 407 U.S. at 88-89.
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dies any different status from that of the general creditor proceeding
under attachment and garnishment laws,25 but it also restricted the
ambit of extraordinary situations that justify postponing notice and
an opportunity for a hearing. The criteria of situations "requiring
special protection to a state or creditor interest" enunciated in
Sniadach5 were stated in Fuentes in terms of necessity "to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. '27 No explan-
ation was offered for the removal of "creditor interests" from the
extraordinary situations test. Perhaps of greater importance in view
of the importance of chattel security to a credit economy was the
Fuentes Court's characterization of the Florida proceedings as fur-
thering "no more than private gain. 128 In this fashion, the general
interest of the public in the availability of credit at low cost and the
contribution of prejudgment repossession of chattel security to that
end was summarily dismissed by the Court in Fuentes.
Ill. THE FLORIDA RESPONSE
The strictures placed on the provisional writs by Fuentes left
little room for these writs to function in their traditional role. Not
surprisingly then, the Florida legislature's response to the invalida-
tion of the state's replevin statute in Fuentes was the removal of
prejudgment replevin with but one highly restricted exception.29 In
lieu of the pre-Fuentes provisions for prejudgment replevin at the
creditor's option,30 the legislature made provision for the secured
party to promptly obtain a hearing prior to final judgment on "an
order directed to the defendant to show cause why the claimed
property should not be taken from the possession of the defendant
and delivered to plaintiff."" Only after the debtor has had the op-
portunity to be heard on the order to show cause and only after the
25. Id. at 86.
26. 395 U.S. at 339.
27. 407 U.S. at 91.
28. Id. at 92.
29. The legislature provided that if the creditor swears in an affidavit that the claimed
property is in danger of destruction, concealment, or removal from the jurisdiction at the
hands of the defendant, and satisfies the court that the defendant will violate a temporary
restraining order, the court may issue a writ of replevin upon a properly filed complaint
without affording notice or a hearing. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.069, 78.073 (1973) (repealed 1976). See
FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (Supp. 1976).
30. FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (1967) (repealed 1973).
31. FLA. STAT. § 78.065 (1975).
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court determines the "probable validity" of the creditor's underly-
ing claim, may the court direct the clerk to issue the writ of re-
plevin."2 This substituted procedure does not constitute a prejudg-
ment remedy although it does conform with the latitude granted by
Fuentes as to the requirements of a hearing prior to even temporary
deprivation. Fuentes made clear that the hearing does not have to
result in a "final judgment," is "open to many potential variations"
and is a subject "for legislation" provided that it establish "the
validity or at least the probable validity of the claim." 3 In order to
protect the secured creditor's precarious position following notice of
his intention to repossess, provision was made for a temporary re-
straining order if the. creditor could reasonably establish that the
debtor was placing the property in danger of destruction, conceal-
ment or removal.34 The only concession to what may have remained
of extraordinary situations excusing prior notice and hearing in
Florida's immediate pre-Fuentes replevin statute was provision for
issuance of the writ without prior hearing when the creditor could
establish the. requisites for issuance of a restraining order, and fur-
ther, that the debtor probably would violate the order.35
Fuentes did indicate a means other than extraordinary situa-
tions by which the creditor could avoid the necessity of affording the
debtor an opportunity for hearing prior to taking. The concept of
advance contractual waiver of due process rights in a civil action
was recognized by the Court in Fuentes, although in none of the
contracts before the Court did the language relied upon establish
the requisite intent of the parties to create such a waiver.36 Provision
for advance contractual waiver of due process rights was not utilized
by the Florida legislature in its enactment of a new replevin statute
following Fuentes. Although provision is made for dispensing with
the order to show cause and thus prompt issuance of a writ of re-
plevin if the debtor has waived his right to be notified and heard,37
the debtor's waiver must be made in accordance with another sec-
tion of the statute which addresses itself only to conduct of the
debtor constituting waiver after receipt of a show cause order. 8 This
32. FLA. STAT. § 78.067 (1975).
33. 407 U.S. at 96-97.
34. FLA. STAT. § 78.069 (1973). See FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (Supp. 1976).
35. See note 29, supra.
36. 407 U.S. at 94-95.
37. FLA. STAT. § 78.065 (1) (1975).
38. FLA. STAT. § 78.075 (1975).
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apparent legislative oversight and the limitations on the concept of
advance contractual waiver of right to notice and hearing would be
worthy of further analysis if Supreme Court cases since Fuentes did
not suggest a more direct means of restoring prejudgment remedies.
IV. Mitchell AND BEYOND: LIMITING THE PRESEIZURE HEARING
REQUIREMENT
Perhaps the best way to put in proper perspective the change
in due process requirements produced by the next decision of the
Supreme Court in this area, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.39 is to
observe, as did the dissenting Justices, that "[tihe only perceivable
change that has occurred since Fuentes is in the makeup of this
court." 0
In Mitchell the seller of goods, like the seller-secured party in
Fuentes, resorted to a prejudgment writ to repossess goods upon the
buyer's default in payments. As was true in Fuentes, the seller-
creditor in Mitchell obtained the writ on his ex parte application
without notice to the debtor or an opportunity for hearing." But,
unlike Fuentes, the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana proce-
dure which made available to the seller a writ of sequestration (sei-
zure of goods) without notice to the debtor or an opportunity for
hearing was valid. For guidance, the Mitchell decision enumerated
several safeguards in providing due process: (1) judicial control; (2)
the amount and nature of information necessary to clearly establish
grounds for seizure; (3) bond posted by the creditor; (4) a prompt
postseizure hearing at which continued enforcement issues could be
resolved; and (5) burden of probable cause for seizure on the credi-
tor.
2
The validity accorded the ex parte application in Mitchell is
surprising since the latitude given legislatures in Fuentes to fashion
the required hearing was clearly limited by one basic requirement:
The hearing must be at a "meaningful time" and that requires
notice and hearing before the seizure "to minimize substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations."' 3 The decision in Mitchell can be
39. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
40. Id. at 635 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). But see Justice Stewart's concur-
ring opinion in North Georgia Finishing, Inc., v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 619, where he
appeared to recede somewhat from this harsh statement of his dissent in Mitchell.
41. Id. at 602.
42. Id. at 615-18.
43. 407 U.S. at 81.
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interpreted as an abrupt change in focus from requiring some type
of adversary hearing prior to even temporary deprivation to requir-
ing protection other than prior notice and an opportunity for the
debtor to be heard. It is suggested that only through this interpreta-
tion can Mitchell be characterized, as the majority opinion does, as
distinguishing Fuentes."
By establishing safeguards independent of any preseizure ad-
versary hearing, Mitchell harbingered restoration of prejudgment
remedies in cases that would not otherwise meet the extraordinary
situations test of Sniadach, as modified and restricted by Fuentes.
Indeed, although the creditor in Mitchell alleged that it had reason
to believe that the debtor would "encumber, alienate or otherwise
dispose of the merchandise" prior to hearing," no specific facts in
the opinion support that allegation other than possibly the general
belief of a lien creditor that any debtor following default is not an
ideal custodian of the property."6 Furthermore, the provisional writ
in Louisiana was triggered not by specific allegations of threatened
or actual conduct by the debtor, but merely by it being "within the
power" of the debtor to diminish the value of the creditor's secu-
rity."7
The Louisiana procedure outlined above, which the Court in
Mitchell validated as reaching "a constitutional accommodation of
the respective interests of buyer and seller"'8 differed from the Flor-
ida replevin provisions found wanting in Fuentes in three respects:
(1) the absence in the Florida proceedings of "judicial order, ap-
proval or participation" in the issuance of the writ;'9 (2) the require-
ment in Louisiana that the writ be issued only on a verified petition
or affidavit alleging specific facts and not merely conclusory state-
ments of ownership or possessory rights;50 and (3) the requirement
in Louisiana that the debtor be provided with the opportunity for
an immediate postseizure hearing and dissolution of the writ unless
the creditor proved the grounds for the remedy. 5' Although as pre-
viously noted, Florida has long provided that the creditor in pre-
44. 416 U.S. at 615-20.
46. Id. at 602.
46. Id. at 608-09.
47. Id. at 605; LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West).
48. Id. at 610.
49. Id. at 606, 608, 615-16.
50. Id. at 605, 615-18.
51. Id. at 606,610, 618.
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judgment replevin must post a bond to protect the debtor against
abuse, Mitchell emphasizes that the Louisiana proceeding required
the creditor's bond to guarantee the debtor his attorney's fees as
well as other damages and expenses.52 Finally, Mitchell noted the
provisions of the Louisiana procedure, also provided by Florida law,
that permitted the debtor to regain possession pending final judi-
cial determination of the case by posting his own bond to protect
the creditor. 3
The creditor in Mitchell is strikingly similar to the secured
party in Florida who uses replevin to recover possession of collateral
following default. The Louisiana seller in Mitchell did not have a
security interest in the property but relied instead on the rights
given creditors to repossess goods sold independent of a security
interest." But in Florida, as with other jurisdictions which have
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, the reclamation rights of a
seller without a security interest are limited to cases in which the
buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent.55 Based on this
difference between an unsecured creditor in Louisiana and an unse-
cured creditor in a UCC jurisdiction, it is suggested that the unse-
cured seller in Mitchell is really the equivalent of a secured creditor
under the Uniform Commercial Code for, without the more liberal
provisions of Louisiana law granting him reclamation rights where
they do not exist under the Code, the seller of consumer durables
would have taken a security interest in the property.
In addition, although the Court in Mitchell emphasized that
the Louisiana "vendor's lien expires if the buyer transfers posses-
sion,"56 in this instance too there is a parallel in the position of the
seller in Mitchell and the secured party in Florida. While the se-
cured party in Florida may perfect his security interest in consumer
goods such as those in Mitchell by filing, 7 he often relies - due to
the cost of filing relative to the size of the transaction - on the
perfected status accorded purchase money secured parties in con-
sumer goods without the necessity of filing or taking possession of
the collateral.s As the latter method of perfection is vulnerable to
52. Id. at 608, 617.
53. Id. at 607-08.
54. See W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, 189-90 (La. 1972).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (2); FLA. STAT. § 672.702 (2) (1975).
56. 417 U.S. at 609.
57. See FLA. STAT. § 679.302 (1) (1975).
58. FLA. STAT. § 679.302 (1)(d) (1975).
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the interests of subsequent innocent buyers for value for their own
personal, family or household purposes,5" however, here again the
position of the secured party in Florida is similar to that of the seller
in Mitchell.
The analogy is an important one for assessing the impact of
Mitchell on all provisional remedies. Mitchell lays great stress on
the creditor's property rights in the goods that were subjected to
provisional writ. The Court emphatically noted: "The question is
not whether a debtor's property may be seized by his creditors,
pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in the property
sought to be seized." 0 Thus, one possible reading of Mitchell could
well limit its modification of Fuentes only as to those creditors who
have a property interest in the goods sought to be subjected to the
writ, independent of lien acquisition by judicial process. In its appli-
cation in Florida this would encompass secured creditors using re-
plevin but not general creditors bringing prejudgment garnishment
and attachment actions to acquire their initial lien status. The ac-
cording of greater prejudgment rights to secured creditors than un-
secured ones was, of course, one argument rejected by the Court in
Fuentes. Once the Court restored secured creditors' prejudgment
remedies in Mitchell, was it a necessary corollary that the same
rules applied to the remedies of unsecured creditors? Although the
Court's opinion in Mitchell is far from clear on this point, the an-
swer to be gleaned from the Supreme Court's next case on the sub-
ject is that compliance with Mitchell probably insulates creditors in
attachment and garnishment as well as replevin.
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.6" the setting
was once again one of prejudgment garnishment by a general credi-
tor. In this instance, however, the writ was directed against a corpo-
rate debtor's bank account, and the underlying claim resulted from
a substantial commercial transaction. Although the creditor had to
allege that he had reason to apprehend the loss of the amount
claimed,62 no specific allegation of any extraordinary situation ap-
pears in the facts of the case. Moreover, the fact that the debtor was
able to and did file a bond resulting in the discharge of the bank as
garnishee63 would seem to belie the presence of any extraordinary
59. FLA. STAT. § 679.307 (2) (1975).
60. 416 U.S. at 604.
61. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
62. Id. at 602, 604.
63. Id. at 604.
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situations relating to disposal or removal of property. Given these
facts, it would appear that if Mitchell's allowance of prejudgment
takings was limited to secured creditors, the Court had an easy basis
for decision in North Georgia Finishing. Absent extraordinary situa-
tions, the rule of Sniadach as modified by Fuentes would dictate the
invalidity of the Georgia proceeding without resort to the due pro-
cess standards of Mitchell. That this was not the basis for the find-
ing of a due process deprivation in North Georgia Finishing mili-
tates against limiting Mitchell's provisions for utilization of pre-
judgment writs to remedies of secured creditors only.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the majority opinion in North
Georgia Finishing would seem on balance to support the proposition
that adherence to Mitchell will validate prejudgment garnishment
and attachment. However, the opinion is not free from ambiguity.
The lack of clarity arises from the Court's reliance on both Fuentes
and Mitchell. After noting that the Georgia court's upholding of the
procedure by limiting Sniadach to wages failed to take account of
Fuentes,4 the Court observes that Fuentes invalidated replevin
statutes that permitted the secured seller to repossess the goods
"without notice or hearing and without judicial order or supervi-
sion."65 Then immediately prior to holding that the Georgia proce-
dure was vulnerable for the same reasons as those advanced in
Fuentes,6" the Court seems to temper its reliance on Fuentes by
application of a pure Mitchell rationale: "Because the official sei-
zures [in Fuentes] had been carried out without notice and without
opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repos-
session, they were held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."67 In addition to seemingly incorporating Mitchell's overlay
on Fuentes by the shift from the conjunctive "and" to the disjunc-
tive "or," the Court in North Georgia Finishing directly addresses
its holding in Mitchell and concludes that "[tihe Georgia garnish-
ment statute has none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana
statute."e
Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the Court's holding in North
Georgia Finishing is undoubtedly a source of concern to legislative
64. Id. at 605-06.
65. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 607.
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draftsmen as it was to those Justices who noted it in their concurring
and dissenting opinions." If North Georgia Finishing did not super-
impose Mitchell on Fuentes, it may follow that all provisional writs
are limited to Fuentes' extraordinary situations. This reading would
invalidate Florida's new replevin provisions for that statute" follows
Mitchell and not Fuentes.
Further support for the primacy of the rule of Mitchell over that
of Fuentes is contained in the recent per curiam opinion of the
Supreme Court in Carey v. Sugar." In Carey the unsecured creditor
sought in state court to attach under New York procedure the debt
owed by one corporation to another. The debtors in the state pro-
ceeding sought a declaration in a federal district court that the
attachment provisions were unconstitutional.7" Although New York
procedure provided the debtor an opportunity for a hearing to va-
cate the attachment prior to judgment, the three-judge federal dis-
trict court held that the postseizure hearing provisions were consti-
tutionally inadequate. The reasoning of the district court (according
to the Supreme Court) was "because the hearing would only be
concerned with the question whether the 'attachment is unneces-
sary to the security of the plaintiff,' and would not require the
plaintiff to litigate the question of the likelihood that it would ulti-
mately prevail on the merits. 7 3 The Supreme Court remanded the
case with directions that the district court abstain from a decision
on the constitutional issues until the parties had an opportunity to
obtain a construction of the state law by the New York courts.74
The Supreme Court's at least tacit approval in Carey of pre-
judgment takings by unsecured creditors, provided Mitchell safe-
guards were present, would offer greater support to the argument
that attachment and garnishment are to be treated as replevin, were
it not for one fact in the case. In Carey, the underlying claim of the
creditor was one which contained several counts alleging fraud on
the part of the defendants.75 As fraud might well be encompassed
within the extraordinary situations of even Fuentes not modified by
69. Id. at 608-620.
70. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01-.21 (1975 and Supp. 1976).
71. 425 U.S. 73 (1976).
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 77. (citations and footnotes omitted).
74. Id. at 79.
75. Id. at 74.
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Mitchell, the case does not necessarily lay to rest the ambiguities
of North Georgia Finishing.
V. Unique Caterers: FLORIDA LAW FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The latest chapter in the saga of the constitutionality of the
prejudgment writs in this state was recently written by the Supreme
Court of Florida. In Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co.,7" the
creditor invoked attachment on the grounds that it "had reason to
believe: (a) the defendant is actually removing all his property to
New Jersey in order to continue doing business there; [and] (b) all
officers, directors and stockholders reside out of the state."" The
opinion of the court reviewed the less than clear dictates of proce-
dural due process arising from Sniadach and its progeny and con-
cluded that an immediate postseizure hearing would suffice for at-
tachment cases."8 The Florida attachment statute was invalidated
on grounds of failure to comply with Mitchell for the court con-
cluded that "most seriously, the statute does not require an immedi-
ate post-seizure hearing, rather it simply keeps the court open at
any time to hear dissolution motions."79 The court also found Flor-
ida's attachment provisions deficient in not requiring a judge to
issue the writ nor requiring a supporting affidavit based on other
than a conclusory allegation of the creditor of the grounds for at-
tachment.8 0
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision bespeaks the change
in focus from Fuentes to Mitchell. Under the rule of the former case
extraordinary situations or the creditor's special need for the process
was the determinative criterion, but the court's reading of Mitchell
and North Georgia Finishing dictates Mitchell's safeguards regard-
less of the presence of extraordinary situations. Unique Caterers was
a four to three decision. Did the three dissenting justices conclude
that the presence of extraordinary situations negated the need for
Mitchell safeguards? One can only speculate on this point for no
dissenting opinion was filed in Unique Caterers. The opinion of the
court does question, however, whether the grounds for Florida's at-
76. 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
77. Id. at 1068 n.2.
78. Id. at 1070 (emphasis added).




tachment proceedings qualify as post-Fuentes extraordinary situa-
tions."
VI. CONCLUSION
If the applicability of Mitchell safeguards to validate prejudg-
ment attachment and garnishment is less than clear, any forthcom-
ing amendment of Florida's statutes on these subjects can present
the remedies in their most favorable constitutional light by not only
incorporating the requisites to prejudgment taking sanctioned by
Mitchell, but also by limiting them to cases presenting a special
need for the processes. Combining Mitchell safeguards with grounds
that limit unsecured creditors' use of prejudgment takings would
incorporate not only the best policy arguments in favor of the writs,
but also reaffirm Florida's historical limitations on the use of pre-
judgment writs by unsecured creditors.
In this regard, it is suggested that some refinement as to what
constitutes grounds for the writs may be in order. The general
grounds for attachment in this state encompassing the nonresi-
dency, absence, or concealment of the debtor or the threatened or
actual removal of the debtor's property" do seem to present instan-
ces of special creditor need. But, for example, special provisions
relating to attachment of a ship or boat for negligence in its naviga-
tion, direction or management that results in injury to person or
property3 might be considered overbroad. This would appear to be
true in instances of the attachment of a vessel of a resident defen-
dant not removing or threatening removal of the vessel or his other
property from the state. Rather, draftsmen may well wish to con-
sider another basis for the nature of the underlying claim giving rise
to the use of the provisional remedy, and that is one suggested by
the facts in Carey. It would appear that a claim based on fraud
might justify the prejudgment taking although Florida has never
recognized such grounds. Finally, the provision for attachment in
aid of foreclosure by a chattel mortgagee84 has been rendered super-
fluous by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in this
state. The Code's unified concept of security interest would make
81. Id. at 1069.
82. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.04-.05 (1975).
83. FLA. STAT. § 76.32 (1975).
84. FLA. STAT. § 76.07 (1975).
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replevin available to all secured parties including those who were
formerly chattel mortgagees.2
As prejudgment garnishment in Florida is probably constitu-
tionally infirm for the same reasons as attachment, any amendment
of the state's garnishment statute might likewise consider refine-
ments as to grounds for the writ. While the creditor's belief that the
debtor will not have in his possession property to satisfy an execu-
tion subsequently issued" would generally limit prejudgment gar-
nishment to cases of special creditor need, the grounds do seem
broader than the general ones for attachment. One can readily pos-
tulate a case in which the debtor in garnishment will not be pos-
sessed of sufficient property, but there is no danger that others will
have disposed of his property in their possession or will have paid
their debt to him prior to issuance of a writ of execution. Moreover,
as there is at least some question of whether any prejudgment gar-
nishment of wages would meet the requirements of Sniadach, the
legislature may wish to prohibit prejudgment garnishment of all
wages in this state.
The above suggestions for insuring that garnishment and at-
tachment be limited to cases of special need are not intended to
necessarily reflect constitutional requisites. Nor are they intended
to reflect adversely on recent legislation in this state which restored
prejudgment replevin in cases in which the debtor "has failed to
make payment as agreed. ' ' "7 The substitution of a general right to
prejudgment replevin when coupled with Mitchell procedural safe-
guards, for a practice embodying temporary restraining orders, and
some highly restricted prejudgment remedies, 8 seems justified
when considered in the framework of a security interest. The debtor
did give the secured party a consensual lien in the property sub-
jected to the writ, and therefore, both creditor and debtor have
property interests at stake. Collateral does depreciate in value, and
the debtor is often not an ideal custodian after default.
When the secured party or anyone else wishes to make use of
prejudgment replevin based on grounds other than failure to make
payment as agreed, the Florida legislature limited the action to
85. See Williams, supra note 8, at 67, 92-93.
86. FLA. STAT. § 77.031 (1975).
87. Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19 § 1, codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (Supp. 1976).
88. Law of May 8, 1973, ch. 73-20 § 1 (repealed 1976). The repealed sections are FLA.
STAT. §§ 78.055 (6), 78.069, 78.073 (1975).
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cases of "conduct that may place the claimed property in danger of
destruction, concealment, waste, removal from the state, removal
from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to an innocent pur-
chaser, during the pendency of the action."8 Where the creditor's
right to possession presents a close issue or where the grounds for
prejudgment replevin are questionable, the legislature has wisely
retained a replevin procedure embodying a taking only after final
hearing on the merits,9" and - in the further alternative - issuance
of the replevin writ after judicial determination of the probable
validity of the plaintiff's claim in a hearing with adversarial input
on an order to show cause.9" Utilization of one of the latter proce-
dures may be well advised even when the debtor has failed to make
payment as agreed to a seller-secured party, but premises his non-
payment on the rights of a buyer upon notice to his seller to deduct
damages for breach of the contract of sale from any part of the price
still due.2 Otherwise, the creditor may be liable for damages sus-
tained by what is subsequently determined to constitute an impro-
per temporary deprivation.
Based on the above analysis which favors limiting attachment
and prejudgment garnishment to cases of special creditor need, it
would appear that the Supreme Court could have more profitably
spent its efforts in imposing an extraordinary situations test and
limiting the parameters thereof. That it did not do so is perhaps the
tragic turn taken in those cases decided subsequent to Sniadach. It
is tempting to conclude that the requirements of Mitchell will do
much to curtail the improper use of prejudgment remedies as credi-
tor leverage for the collection of justly disputed or even fraudulent
claims. However, this writer does not feel the changes are so signifi-
cant as to justify such a conclusion.
89. Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19 § 1,codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (Supp. 1976).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (1975).
91. See FLA. STAT. § 78.067 (1975).
92. See FLA. STAT. § 672.717 (1975).
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